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Silent leges inter arma. During war, the laws are silent.
Marcus Tullius Cicero, ProMilone 11
I. Introduction
Alone on the high seas, on the verge of the 19th century, the Spanish gal-
leon San Dominick, captained by Benito Cereno, is engulfed in revolu-
tion when its cargo decides to alter their status.1 The slaves’ rebellion, led 
by their most intelligent, Babo, and their strongest, Atufal, upends the 
Spaniards’ routine transportation of their “legal property” to the New 
World. When an American ship crosses paths with the San Dominick, 
its captain, Amasa Delano, boards the Spanish galleon as Cereno’s guest, 
blissfully unaware that Cereno is no longer in power. Knowing that his 
rebellion will be quickly quashed if the Americans discover the slaves’ 
mutiny, Babo orchestrates an elaborate act, in which the slaves pretend 
to be slaves, and the masters pretend to be masters, on pain of death. 
Eventually, though, Cereno manages to alert the naïve Delano to the situa-
tion, and the Americans promptly overpower the slaves with their superior 
strength, numbers, and fi repower. In the battle, Atufal is shot and killed, 
and Babo is captured. He is taken back to land and subjected to a trial 
under Spanish law. With all “due process,” Babo is tried, and hanged.
On the high seas, the law is the tool of the strong, not necessarily the 
just. What passes for “governing law” on the high seas is not a mutually 
agreed-upon compact of peace and order between equals, but the law 
of the slave owners, enforced at gunpoint. In the sea of international 
relations, a veneer of agreements, protocols, and resolutions passes for 
public international law. But as Herman Melville’s 1855 novella Benito 
Cereno suggests (certainly not for the fi rst or last time), law is meaning-
less in the absence of power. While a putative fi rst-world defi nition of 
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“law” is absolutely dependent on mutual compacts between equals, the 
inequality between fi rst world and third world in international relations, 
represented by the novella’s white owners and black slaves, means that 
there can be no such compact. How can treaties between “partners” that 
are radically unequal be bargained for fairly and justly? How will deals 
between the developed and developing world be enforced when—not if, 
but when—the powerful decide to abrogate their agreements and fl out 
the very notion of an international law? What recourse, for example, do 
Bangladesh and Micronesia—countries whose very existence is threat-
ened by global warming—have against the United States for abandon-
ing the Kyoto Protocol? If a just law requires a contract of equals, public 
international law is a “knot of contrariety” between two paradoxical 
pulls. On one end of the rope is the fi rst world’s advocacy of democracy 
and justice. On the other end is the fi rst world’s vested interest in main-
taining the globe’s order of inequality.
Babo’s execution may suggest that any temporary disorder on the high 
seas will be ordered by the law of the victor, inexorably quelled, by vio-
lence if necessary. But Captain Benito Cereno’s desolate demise, follow-
ing shortly after the legal formalism of his testimony in the Babo case as 
presented through a deposition transcript, hints that even the master of 
a system of radical inequality cannot survive it.
This paper examines the connections between the power imbalance 
on the high seas of Melville’s text and the power imbalance that inheres 
in international relations, in order to explore how parties of unequal 
status behave, and why they behave as they do, in the absence of a con-
trolling and enforcing authority. Section II discusses the power politics 
surrounding the formation of two recent international treaties. Section 
III explores the similarities between the formation of these treaties and 
Melville’s concept of the law of the high seas. Section IV discusses the 
complexities in the concept of self-defense in criminal law and its appli-
cation to these questions. Finally, Section V asks whether Melville offers 
any lessons on power politics, or whether Benito Cereno (the man or 
the text) suggests any way to cut the Gordian knot2 that is the law in a 
world of unequally powered relationships—whether it may be possible 
for international law to rise above the paradox of its birth.
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II. The Ratifi cation Process In Two Recent Treaties
As the world’s most powerful nation-state, the United States plays a sig-
nifi cant role—be it a benefi cial one or a detrimental one—in virtually 
every major international treaty. Two recent major treaties, the Rome 
Convention forming an International Criminal Court and the Kyoto 
Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, proved no exception.3 In both cases, the United States took 
part in the negotiations for these treaties, attempting to form them 
to suit the United States’ desires—hardly an unusual or blameworthy 
move, as all nations negotiating the treaties were doing the same. Yet the 
United States failed to ratify both treaties, leaving their effi cacy uncer-
tain at best. In both cases, the United States defended its non-ratifi ca-
tion as a defense of its interests, and implying an attack by the treaty-
supporting countries.
A. The Rome Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
The Rome Convention forming an International Criminal Court (ICC) 
was adopted on July 17, 1998 by a vote of 120 to 7 among the coun-
tries discussing it. All European Union member states voted in favor of 
the treaty, as well as some countries whose governments had good rea-
sons to oppose a criminal court that would punish large-scale human 
rights violations, such as Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Voting against the treaty were the People’s Republic of China, 
Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Qatar, Israel, and the United States. Following the 
vote, the countries that voted for it each went to their national legisla-
tures to ratify the Convention. The treaty quickly reached the 89 coun-
tries necessary (under its own terms) to come into force.
United States President Bill Clinton signed the treaty on the last 
date it was open for signature, December 31, 2000. However, when 
he signed it, Clinton explicitly said that he had no intention to submit 
it to the Senate for ratifi cation (as is arguably necessary under the 
Constitution).4 Clinton cited the United States government’s concern 
that the ICC would exercise jurisdiction over United States soldiers in-
volved in United Nations peacekeeping missions abroad. The George 
W. Bush administration distanced itself more permanently from the 
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treaty, saying that the United States had no intention to become a 
party to it.5 Despite American opposition, the ICC collected enough 
ratifying countries to launch, without the Americans, on March 11, 
2003.6
One might think that the United States, as an actor ostensibly con-
cerned with the rule of law, might like to have an International Criminal 
Court. Such a forum would provide the ability to try widely acknowl-
edged war criminals without the political diffi culty of unilateral action. 
Additionally, a ready-made forum alleviates the need to set up special 
ad hoc tribunals as was done in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, each of which 
took a great deal of time and political capital to initiate, and each of 
which have been haunted by ineffi ciencies that a permanent tribunal 
might be able to avoid through regularized practice.7 However, concerns 
over the protection of American interests against foreign countries who 
might seek to bring United States citizens in front of this Tribunal out-
weighed any perceived benefi ts, and so the United States backed out of 
the Rome Convention.
The Kyoto Protocol was born from the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Protocol was signed 
by the United States (specifi cally by then-Vice President Al Gore) on 
November 12, 1998, joining 177 other nations. The Protocol called for 
a 5% reduction in carbon dioxide by 2012 from advanced nations, and 
essentially exempted many developing nations, such as China and India, 
from those targets.8
Two conditions were required for the Kyoto Protocol to come into 
force. First, the Protocol must be ratifi ed by at least 55 of the coun-
tries that originally signed the Convention (known as Annex I coun-
tries). Second, the ratifying countries must represent among them at 
least 55% of the carbon dioxide emissions from Annex I countries 
for 1990.9 After being stalled just short of the 55% level for some 
time, the Kyoto Protocol achieved these ratifi cation goals and entered 
into force on February 16, 2005, ninety days after Russia ratifi ed the 
treaty.10
The United States alone could have ratifi ed the treaty before Russia’s 
ratifi cation, as the United States is the world’s largest producer of green-
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house gases, emitting around 25% of the total. However, once again, 
the Bush administration distanced itself from an international treaty 
the United States had signed, publicly withdrawing from the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Protocol was never submitted for ratifi cation to the 
United States Senate,11 since that body would not have ratifi ed it—in 
fact, the Senate passed a resolution (by a vote of 98 to 0) making rati-
fi cation of the Kyoto Protocol conditional on assurances that United 
States’ competitiveness in world markets would not be harmed. As one 
conservative American critic put it, “Kyoto is arguably in truth an eco-
nomic instrument by which foreign competitors hope to mitigate U.S. 
competitive advantages.”12 Again, the rationale presented was one of a 
defense of United States interests—and once more against “foreigners,” 
the developing world who would be exempt from restricting their own 
pollution so as to enhance their economic development.
There has been, of course, a wealth of opinion on the costs, benefi ts, 
and climatological effects of the Kyoto Protocol. But one point is starkly 
clear: to the extent a cost/benefi t analysis is predictable and would yield 
net benefi ts, such benefi ts would inure disproportionately to poorer 
countries. One such analysis of the Kyoto Protocol predicts a global 
benefi t-to-cost ratio of $166 trillion to $94 trillion, but because the 
costs would be borne principally by the fi rst world, the ratio for the fi rst 
world would be less than one, which explains the United States’ disinter-
est in signing on.13 And the worst-case costs of not controlling carbon 
emissions are not just hampered child development due to local pollu-
tion, but a global sea-level rise, which could be disastrous in low-lying 
countries such as Bangladesh and Micronesia. How can such countries, 
with neither altitude nor affl uence, bargain with the fi rst world in de-
fense of their very existence?
III. Rome, Kyoto, Senegal, Peru
The purpose of a treaty, like the purpose of any contract, is to protect 
agreed-upon rights, and provide for predictability and stability in a rela-
tionship. But how protective and predictive is a contract—or a treaty—
if it can be abrogated at will by the stronger party? And what incentives 
prevent the stronger party from abrogating those agreements?14
194
Ja so n  P.  Go t t l i eb
A. Entering Unequal Treaties . . .
The formation of the contract may affect how we analyze that ques-
tion. At one point during the revolt aboard the San Dominick, Benito 
Cereno enters a kind of contract with Babo: if the former slaves stop 
killing the Spaniards, Cereno, the ship’s only remaining capable naviga-
tor, will guide them from their current position (off the coast of Peru) 
to Senegal. In the midst of a slave rebellion, a treaty of equals seems to 
emerge. They need each other: Cereno is dependent on Babo for his life 
in an immediate way, and Babo is dependent on Cereno if he ever wants 
to return to Africa safely. This is a contract that could not have been 
made between master and slave.15
Who has the superior bargaining position in the formation of this 
contract? Most immediately, the ship is bereft of crew and short of sup-
plies, and probably is not capable of sailing across the South Atlantic to 
Senegal. The slaves may not actually need Cereno to pilot them back to 
a local harbor where they can restock and repair, making him of little 
immediate use—and thus expendable. But they will need Cereno once 
they reach a local harbor to secure provisions, since the local Spanish au-
thorities would quickly recapture masterless slaves captaining a Spanish 
galleon. And if the former slaves decide to press on to Senegal, with or 
without fresh supplies, Cereno’s advantage increases, as his navigation 
skills will be needed all the more.
As with many contract negotiations, information is key. Cereno’s 
strategy depends on what he knows (or what he thinks he knows) about 
what Babo knows (or what he thinks he knows). Babo may have no idea 
they are close to South America and that a local port is an option. If he 
thinks their only option is to sail across the seas to Senegal, and Cereno 
is vital to that grand plan, Cereno’s bargaining power is improved. On 
the other hand, they have little to no chance of reaching Senegal in 
their current depleted state. If Cereno knows that (and Babo does not), 
Cereno is playing a desperate strategy: betting on Babo’s ignorance of 
the impossibility of their voyage, he may be stalling, playing time as his 
only card, as skillfully as he can. Or, if Cereno knows that an attempt 
to go to Senegal will surely result in his (and everyone else’s) death, and 
a local landing is their only option, he could be angling for such a local 
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landing. Again relying on Babo’s ignorance, Cereno could keep the ship 
at sea for some time—enough to make it seem to inexperienced sailors 
like a transatlantic voyage, but not enough so that their supplies run 
out—before a turn back to Spanish territory in South America. Cereno 
may also be gambling that even if his ploy were discovered, Babo would 
be hard-pressed to enforce their deal, given that Babo’s basic method of 
enforcement (killing Cereno) is only effective in its threat.16 The deal is 
not only unenforceable: Cereno is in fact quite likely to breach it in any 
event. He knows that in the unlikely event they should actually reach 
Senegal, he will have outlived his usefulness.
All of the above stratagems were worth considering when negotiat-
ing this contract. But all of the strategies assume rational actors. Cereno 
does not know whether, despite their recent enslavement and debase-
ment, Babo and all of the former slaves will be rational and patient 
during any such “negotiations.” Indeed, Babo does not know whether, 
despite his recent enslavement and debasement, and the constant threat 
of imminent death, Cereno is still capable of the same. So each party 
has imperfect information about the counterparty’s intentions, and even 
less perfect information about the probability of success for any possible 
choice. Who, then, is the “stronger” party? This might be a moment of 
true equality between the parties after all—neither Cereno nor Babo 
have much hope of extricating themselves from their current positions. 
Both are equally stuck.
Regardless of how equitable the eventual “contract” may seem, in the 
end, this treaty seems forced upon Cereno, given the more immedi-
ate threat to his own life, making Babo not his equal, but his superior. 
How highly, then, should Cereno have valued that contract? If the law 
is meaningless in the absence of an outside power capable of brokering 
and enforcing equal agreements, contracts are made with whatever ad-
vantage can be brought to the table at the time of formation, and broken 
at the fi rst opportunity for advantage.
B. . . . Leaving Them . . .
Realizing the hopelessness of the deal he has entered, Benito Cereno 
abrogates his agreement to take Babo to Senegal by signaling his di-
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lemma to the Americans at the fi rst opportunity he can do so without 
being killed. As the American captain Amasa Delano takes his leave and 
boards his own ship, Cereno jumps aboard Delano’s ship. In the chaos 
that ensues, the Americans amply demonstrate their strength, both in-
dividually and collectively. Captain Delano begins the battle by assess-
ing the situation: he physically holds down Cereno with one hand, and 
Babo with one foot, while he pauses to consider the situation, and who 
may pose a real threat to himself and his crew. Delano, however, quickly 
grasps the situation, deciding that Cereno is escaping from Babo, and 
that he should come to Cereno’s aid. He thus surrenders the role of 
an arbiter to become a partisan, and orders an American attack. The 
Americans swiftly overtake the Spanish ship and install a new order.
Cereno’s physically manifested leap out of his agreement with Babo 
begs the question: does a party to a contract, however entered, have a 
moral right to abrogate that contract at will? The fi rst answer in the laws 
of an advanced nation is the underpinning of the entirety of contract 
law: contracts must be honored, assuming, rightly or wrongly, that the 
parties entered the deal freely.17 When a party abrogates a contract in the 
law of the developed world, the counterparty, weaker or stronger, gen-
erally has recourse to a neutral forum with the power to administer the 
dispute and enforce compliance with the terms of the deal (or at least 
award monetary damages against an aggrieved party).
But sometimes there is no such neutral arbiter, or as in Delano’s case, 
the neutral party becomes a partisan. We might all agree that a suf-
fi ciently great harm being infl icted on a weaker party by their treaty 
partner in the context of the treaty relationship justifi es abrogation. The 
type or level of “harm” that is suffi cient to justify breaking a treaty is 
a fact-specifi c inquiry in each instance, and of course this inquiry will 
depend on the (third-party) inquirer’s opinion of what is justifi ed. Babo 
and Atufal’s revolt signals an abrogation of the revolting “treaty” forced 
upon them. Babo and Atufal were clearly not willing parties to a contract 
of slavery, but once captured and brought on board the San Dominick, 
a deal was implicit: they behave like slaves, and in return, they remain 
alive. It does not take a “treaty” as unequal as a compact of slavery for a 
third-party observer to sympathize with and support the weaker party in 
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abrogating the deal. American contract law is fi lled with (controversial) 
examples of judges allowing a party to breach a contract entered from a 
radically weaker bargaining position under the doctrine of unconscio-
nability.18 So the law recognizes situations in which weaker parties may 
breach their contracts, and indeed, abrogation is all but inevitable when 
an unequal treaty is forced on a weaker party and will infl ict suffi ciently 
great harm on that party. It is not diffi cult to sympathize morally with 
the weaker party in these instances.
But is there ever a justifi cation for a stronger party to abrogate a treaty, 
or, further, to refuse to enter a treaty that will not inure entirely to its 
benefi t? In rejecting the Rome Convention, the justifi cation offered by 
the United States was potential violence to Americans in the form of 
imprisonment (or at least violence to their due process rights). In re-
jecting the Kyoto Protocol, the United States justifi cation was potential 
“violence” to its economic interests. Finding harm suffi cient to justify 
breaking a contract is a matter of opinion. And power helps opinions 
prevail.
C. . . . And Enforcing Them Against Those Who Leave.
Justifi cation or fairness aside, Spanish justice applies to Babo in the end, 
and he is tried for crimes under Spanish law. In modern international 
law of the sea jurisprudence, the law that is applicable aboard a vessel 
on the high seas is the law that is applicable in the home country of that 
vessel. Every vessel is supposed to have a “nationality,” and fl y the fl ag of 
a given country. The “fl ag state” is supposed to exercise effective author-
ity and control over the ship, and may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe, 
adjudicate, and enforce any conduct that takes place on the ship.19 In 
the case of the San Dominick, fl ying under a Spanish fl ag, Spanish jus-
tice applied to Babo from the moment he came aboard. Once Babo is 
transported back to land, he is subjected to the penalties of Spanish 
colonial law. The law on the land ends up being much the same as on 
sea—the strong win, and, as demonstrated by Babo, who never again 
speaks after his defeat on the ship (including at his trial), the weak don’t 
even have a voice. The only difference between the law of land and sea 
is that the law on land is better dressed, clothed in the formality of legal 
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process, a process more expansive than at sea, where juries, lawyers, and 
appellate courts are in short supply.
The pomp and circumstance of judicial process in a formal courtroom 
may salve our consciences about an execution—but only when we are 
comfortable with the system that renders the verdict. If Babo had pre-
vailed, taken Benito Cereno to Senegal, given Cereno a fair trial under 
Senegalese law, and then executed him, would we be comfortable saying 
justice had been done? Perhaps. Could such a trial be called fair? In our 
positions, in our day and age, we might be comfortable with such a trial 
precisely because it would not be “fair,” so much as it might be consid-
ered “just”—the slave trader adjudged by the slaves.
If the result of Babo’s trial, or a hypothetical Senegalese trial of Benito 
Cereno, would be a foregone conclusion, why have a trial in the fi rst 
place? United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, who led the 
United States prosecution team at the Nuremberg trials, offers one pos-
sible answer: the judicial process provides a historical record upon which 
we can refl ect, while trying to build a fairer system. In his opening state-
ment at those tribunals, Justice Jackson stated:
That four great nations, fl ushed with victory and stung with 
injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their 
captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most 
signifi cant tributes that power has ever paid to reason. . . . We 
must never forget that the record on which we judge these de-
fendants today is the record on which history will judge us to-
morrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put 
it to our own lips as well. (98)
The powerful nations, the ones who set the rules, are not destined to 
be powerful forever, and rules designed to favor the powerful only en-
courage the powerful to do whatever is necessary to remain in power. 
How can the community of nations ensure the fairness of a process of 
justice, ensure that the strong do not defi ne that process to the detri-
ment of the weak?
Giving a “voice” to the weak is not much good when, as in Babo’s trial, 
its use would be utterly unavailing. Indeed, even the idea of “giving” a 
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voice is problematic. If a weaker party’s opportunity to speak is tied to 
a procedural format that is tailored by a stronger party, the opportunity 
may be rendered insignifi cant. It is hardly generous justice to allow the 
accused the opportunity to speak for an artifi cially brief period, or with 
undue evidentiary or other constraints. Even an accused as intelligent 
as Babo would have no reason to understand the formal rules of a trial. 
From his point of view, the trial would be a baffl ing sequence of times 
when he may speak (and why, and on what subjects), and times when 
he is required to be silent; arguments he may make, and arguments he 
will be summarily disallowed from making. Babo likely recognized the 
uselessness of a slave’s “self-defense” claim, which I will discuss further, 
assuming that no Spanish court would recognize that a slave had any 
such right. Procedure can be an instrument of enslavement as easily as it 
can be an instrument of justice.20
Even the necessary (and thus seemingly innocent) requirement of 
a common language disadvantages the weaker party. However unap-
pealing Babo’s hypothetical statement of defense might have been to a 
Spanish-speaking court, a presentation in his native language would have 
been far less convincing to that assembly. The problem is not simply one 
of translation. At the United Nations, a cadre of skilled translators is 
always available to translate words and grammar, but a phrase asserted in 
the “language” of fi rst-world industrial economics regarding a tradeoff 
between employment percentages and environmental protection may 
be incomprehensible in the language of an island nation whose existence 
is threatened by that econometric tradeoff. A Spanish judge’s careful 
explanation of the law of slavery—even skillfully translated into Babo’s 
native language—would be unlikely to convince Babo why the violent 
enslavement of a Spaniard was punishable by death while the violent 
enslavement of an African was perfectly acceptable.
We can design, in all good faith, a system of checks and balances, 
but such a system is useless when no power is strong enough to check 
any other single power. We can try to design a system where there are 
no “majorities,” no singular power, but what happens if one power be-
comes stronger than all others? Or when coalitions of pluralities form a 
strong majority, giving that majority the ability to act against the weak 
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unilaterally and with absolute force? Once the powerful are entrenched, 
is there any way to solve this problem, other than waiting for the fall of 
empire?
IV. The Right of Self-Defense in Criminal Law
Babo, Atufal, and the rest of the former slaves do not merely overpower 
their captors. They kill most of the Spaniards, and indeed cannibalize at 
least one of them. Was the harm infl icted upon them suffi cient to justify 
their revolt and murder? Was the harm infl icted by Babo and Atufal in 
their revolt suffi cient to justify an American assault that re-enslaves or 
kills them? These questions echo longstanding debates in criminal law 
regarding the boundaries of the right of self-defense.
Generally speaking, a person has a right of self-defense to prevent an 
imminent harm to himself.21 All but the most devout pacifi sts would 
agree that, if Adam is in the process of punching Bill (or has done so 
already), Bill is morally entitled to punch back, in order to stop Adam’s 
assault. Common law countries tend to codify that moral judgment. 
Further, Bill has a right of mortal self-defense (i.e., killing his attacker) 
to prevent an imminent mortal harm to himself (i.e., his own death). 
So, if Adam is indisputably going to kill Bill (Adam has his sword out, 
say, and is rushing at Bill screaming death threats), Bill is legally justifi ed 
in drawing his gun and shooting Adam. But the doctrine of self-defense 
requires proportionality: Bill may draw his gun and fi re in self-defense if 
Adam is rushing at him with pointed sword, but Bill may not fi re away 
if Adam is merely throwing a punch.22 Most jurisdictions extend the 
right of mortal self-defense to prevent an imminent mortal harm not 
only to the defender, but also to a third party. So, if Adam is indisput-
ably going to kill Bill (again, Adam has his sword out, rushing at Bill, 
screaming threats), and Carol wanders onto the scene and witnesses the 
events unfolding, Carol is justifi ed in killing Adam to save Bill.23
In these examples, it is a given that harm is imminent. But it is not 
always so clear. Most common-law jurisdictions in the United States re-
quire the harm to be objectively imminent, but a few jurisdictions (and 
the Model Penal Code)24 require only a subjective belief of imminent 
harm. The former, the objective standard, requires there to be actual ob-
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jective danger of mortal harm in order to justify infl icting mortal harm 
in self-defense. The attacker actually must be attacking with deadly 
force, and it is not suffi cient for the defender merely to believe such an 
attack was imminent. The latter, the subjective standard, would only re-
quire that the defender “reasonably believed” (or some similarly worded 
standard) that mortal harm was imminent. In a jurisdiction that re-
quires objective danger to exercise self-defense, the defender must prove 
the danger to him in order to be excused from any violence commit-
ted in self-defense. In a jurisdiction that requires a subjective belief of 
danger to exercise self-defense, the defender must only prove that he 
believed that there was a danger to him.25
As a concrete example of the important difference between these two 
regimes, let’s say that Bill claims Adam has “deadly weapons,” and is 
about to use them on Bill. Bill thus kills Adam in “self-defense.” But in 
truth, Adam does not have any such weapons. Under the objective stan-
dard, Bill’s claim of self-defense is untenable, and Bill should be subject 
to the legal penalties for murder. Under the subjective standard, Bill 
would only have to believe that Adam was about to employ his deadly 
weapons, and at most, Bill would be required to prove to some neutral 
arbiter (should one be found) that he had some reasonable grounds to 
believe Adam’s deadly attack was imminent.26
The parallels to the problems of modern international law should be 
clear. For example, what if the United States claims Iraq has deadly weap-
ons and is about to use them on the United States, and thus attacks Iraq in 
self-defense? Under the objective standard, if Iraq in truth does not have 
any such weapons or was not about to use them, the claim of self-defense 
is untenable, and legal penalties should follow. Under the subjective stan-
dard, the United States would merely have to believe that Iraq was about 
to use its deadly weapons, and at most, the United States would have to 
prove to some neutral arbiter—should one be found—that there was rea-
sonable grounds to believe a deadly attack was imminent.
The introduction of a third party yields another problem. Let us say, as 
above, Adam is (objectively) about to kill Bill (sword out, death threats 
screamed). Bill is justifi ed in drawing his gun, shouting a few choice 
threats in response, and shooting Adam in self-defense. But this time, 
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before Bill can draw his gun, Carol walks onto the scene. As mentioned 
above, Carol would be justifi ed in killing Adam on Bill’s behalf, in an 
exercise of the right of self-defense as applied to the defense of third par-
ties. But, Carol got to this particular scene a little late, and did not see 
the objective imminent threat from Adam. She only sees Bill with gun 
drawn, shouting his threats. Carol misunderstands the situation, and 
thinks that Adam’s sword waving is a desperate act of self-defense against 
Bill’s gun attack. Is Carol justifi ed in killing Bill to defend Adam from 
Bill’s imminent mortal attack?
Under the objective standard, Carol got it wrong. Bill was not an ag-
gressor, but was rather acting in self-defense, and thus Carol should not 
have killed Bill—and the appropriate legal penalties may be applied to 
Carol. However, under the subjective standard, Carol had good reason 
to believe that Bill was the aggressor, and would have little trouble argu-
ing to a neutral arbiter that she (Carol) indeed believed that, and that 
her belief was reasonable. Thus, in such a jurisdiction, Carol will be ex-
cused from liability on the basis that it was an appropriate extension of 
the right of self-defense to the defense of a third party.
Once again, parallels to international law are clear. As an example that 
is hopefully more far-fetched: what if the United States claims Iran has 
weapons of mass destruction and is about to use them on Israel, and 
thus attacks Iran in defense of Israel? If Iran really was about to attack 
Israel, then the United States would be justifi ed under either an objec-
tive or subjective standard. But if Iran’s attack was actually an exercise of 
self-defense against an attack by Israel—an attack that was either objec-
tively about to occur, or Iran subjectively believed was about to occur—
then the United States would itself have to assert the subjective stan-
dard; that it had reason to believe that Iran was the aggressor. Of course, 
lacking a truly neutral arbiter of such a claim, the United States would 
never really be required to justify its actions.27
With this analysis as predicate, we now return to the question of 
whether the harm infl icted by Babo and Atufal in their revolt is suf-
fi cient to justify the American assault that re-enslaves or kills them. 
Captain Delano (Carol, in our hypothetical analysis) has wandered onto 
a scene in which Babo has infl icted harm on Benito Cereno and his 
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crew. But between Babo and Cereno, who is our Adam, the “objective” 
initiator of violence? Certainly, the slave revolt is mortally violent, but 
is Cereno’s transportation of slaves less of an act of violence just because 
these particular slaves were not killed? Under the subjective standards of 
self-defense extended to third parties outlined above, Delano’s violent 
quelling of the slave rebellion is excusable—he came to the scene just in 
time to witness the slaves’ mortal violence against the Spanish, after the 
capture of the slaves (probably violent, but not mortally so) was com-
pleted. Delano may have “reasonably believed”—to the extent that such 
a belief was reasonable at the time—that the slaves were the instigators 
of the mortal violence.
Of course, as noted above, most jurisdictions would allow mortal self-
defense against certain heinous crimes, even when not mortal, and kid-
napping and enslavement might easily to fall into that category. But 
recall the year of Melville’s writing (1855) and the year in which the 
story is set (1799)—at these times, the question of whether enslave-
ment is a crime that justifi es mortal self-defense in response was rather 
more hotly debated. In The Amistad, the Supreme Court case whose 
facts Melville undoubtedly adopted for Benito Cereno, slaves aboard a 
Spanish schooner en route from one Cuban port to another rose up and 
killed their masters, only to be “salvaged” later by an American ship off 
the coast of Long Island (40 U.S. 518 1841). The Spanish captain of 
the Amistad, whose life the slaves had spared for his navigation abili-
ties, sailed the ship east (toward Africa) during the days, but northwest 
at night, in an apparent attempt to reach the Southern United States. 
Once the ship was discovered, the Spanish made a claim for the return 
of their “property,” including the ship and the slaves. The United States 
Supreme Court refused the Spanish claim, holding that if the Africans 
had been slaves under Spanish law, they ought to be returned. However, 
they were not slaves, because they had been “procured” contrary to an 
1820 treaty between Spain and Britain forbidding the importation of 
slaves to British territories. Instead, they were deemed to be:
[K]idnapped Africans, who, by the laws of Spain itself, are en-
titled to their freedom, and were kidnapped and illegally car-
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ried to Cuba, and illegally detained and restrained on board 
the Amistad; there is no pretence to say, that they are pirates 
or robbers. We may lament the dreadful acts by which they as-
serted their liberty, and took possession of the Amistad, and 
endeavored to regain their native country; but they cannot be 
deemed pirates or robbers, in the sense of the law of nations. 
(40 U.S. at 594)
Justice Joseph Story’s opinion thus appears to forgive the slaves’ vi-
olent acts, casting them instead as self-defense—even while caution-
ing that if the Africans’ capture had been “legal” under Spanish law, 
his ruling might have been different.28 As a counter-example, consider 
the 1831 slave rebellion in Southampton County, Virginia, led by Nat 
Turner, which claimed the lives of over 50 whites, mostly slave owners 
and their families. Scores of blacks were killed in return—not only those 
who participated in the rebellion, and not only by organized judicial 
process. After the rebellion, Virginia’s state legislature considered abol-
ishing slavery in order to prevent any recurrences, but in the end, de-
cided instead to tighten slavery codes: an unsurprising result.29
In each “jurisdiction,” the question of whether self-defense was an al-
lowable claim was decided by those in power, depending in large part 
on the tolerance levels of those in power for slavery. After considering 
the historical context, we are led to harder questions: would Delano be 
justifi ed in using deadly force to quell the slave revolt under an “objec-
tive” standard of self-defense? Whose objectivity is to be used as the 
measuring stick, and how much has that “objectivity” changed in the 
last two hundred years? How different are these two theories of self-
defense, when what is “objective” is defi ned by a majority that enjoys a 
tremendous power advantage, to the point that their subjective beliefs 
become objective truths, particularly in the application of law through 
a “reasonability” standard? A community of nations with no neutral ar-
biter and no interest except self-defense is the ultimate in a subjective 
system of law. In such a system, how do we avoid a situation where the 
strong act against the weak, within or without the law, unilaterally and 
with absolute force?
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V. The Lessons of Power Politics
Melville offers a way out of this thicket, but it is not a promising one. 
Aboard the San Dominick, before Delano realizes the truth of the sit-
uation, he watches a Spanish sailor nervously tying what is described 
as a Gordian knot. The sailor tells Delano that it is “for someone else 
to undo,”(176) and then throws it at him, telling Delano (in the only 
English spoken on the ship), “Undo it, cut it, quick” (176). The knot 
might well be Walt Whitman’s “knot of contrariety,” the contradicto-
ry understanding of slavery in an ostensibly democratic country like 
America in the 18th and 19th century.30 And although Whitman’s 
“Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” was written in 1856, one year before Benito 
Cereno, the Spanish sailor sounds to be echoing Whitman’s verse: “I am 
he who knew what it was to be evil” (line 70 967). Although Delano 
ponders the knot, he succeeds only in making himself queasy. The knot 
is tossed around the ship a bit, and eventually thrown overboard. The 
voyagers, black and white, see no solution but to toss it into the sea. The 
sailor’s solution (and perhaps Melville’s), to “cut it quick,” is the brutal 
Alexandrian solution; it would render the rope useless. But it is the so-
lution the Americans employ: aboard the San Dominick, the Americans 
untangle the slave revolt like a sword through rope, at signifi cant cost 
to both crews. And, to stretch the analogy of the Gordian knot, the 
Americans have once again fulfi lled that ancient prophecy—undoing 
the knot by use of the sword, and by those means winning an empire.
At least one among the (supposedly) stronger party is rendered useless 
by the episode. After the revolt is quashed and his deposition testimony 
proffered, Cereno’s health quickly fails. He predicts his own death, de-
claring that what has “cast such a shadow” on him is “the Negro” (222). 
Slavery reversed has made the master understand the nature of slavery. 
After experiencing the life of a slave—after knowing what it is to be evil, 
and to have evil infl icted upon him—Cereno’s life is no longer worth 
living. But having tasted the bitterness of slavery, what other choice does 
Benito Cereno have? Can he return to captaining slave ships? Can he, 
in a Spanish colony in 1799, become an abolitionist? Can he escape the 
question altogether by rejecting his society? If the knot is not cut by the 
sword, it can only be tossed into the sea. Although we do not see Cereno’s 
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funeral, we can imagine it is that of a sailor: like the knot, burial at sea, 
the only other way to “solve” the problem of the knot.
What lessons can the stronger parties of the world draw from this 
conclusion? What would it take to move the fi rst world to champion 
the weak, or at least to construct a process through which the weak have 
a true voice? Perhaps it would take a revolt, a violent upending of the 
slavemasters, even if only temporary, to make a strong actor who is abus-
ing that strength understand the plight of the weak. After all, it took the 
Civil War and the subjugation of the South to end slavery in the United 
States. One would hope that lesser measures could convince the United 
States merely to honor agreements it signs. But in the absence of a truly 
neutral arbiter, violence perpetrated by the weak of the world against the 
strong would almost certainly not be seen by the strong as self-defense, 
but as an act of aggression—a criminal act, much as Babo is criminal-
ized for his act of rebellion, which he undoubtedly viewed as justifi able 
self-defense.
Melville was probably not writing with a violent solution in mind, or 
to provoke a war, but rather to force the stronger parties of his time to 
think about the problems of a society in which the strong arrange and 
enforce unfair “agreements” and “protocols” with the weak, only to ab-
rogate those deals when convenient. An objective system depends on 
a neutral arbiter of such disputes, and in a world where all parties are 
interested, only process can be neutral. Such a neutral process in the in-
ternational context requires a tribunal in which the membership rotates 
regularly, such that no party is forever the stronger, and rule of law is 
honored not out of convenience or momentary self-interest, but out of 
fear of being the powerless defendant in the next trial. It is not neces-
sary for the slavemasters to be made slaves to understand that a system 
of masters and slaves is unjust. It is only necessary that the slavemasters 
understand that they, like Captain Benito Cereno, forever run that risk, 
and their best defense is not abuse of power, but use of process. For the 
United States to be concerned that the International Criminal Court 
would exercise jurisdiction over United States soldiers may well be the 
strongest indication that the ICC would be just: only when each coun-
try is concerned that it might be unfairly targeted next by the ICC are 
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the members of that body likely to enact and effectuate neutral proce-
dures that will maintain a balance between the powerful and power-
less. The problems inherent in the interaction between unequal powers 
that Melville frames did not end with the Emancipation Proclamation, 
and will not end with the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto 
Protocol. The lessons of Benito Cereno—text and man—are still worth 
study and debate in the corridors of the powerful, and the powerless.
Notes
 1 A version of this paper was fi rst presented at the annual convention of the 
American Comparative Literature Association in April 2003. I am utterly in-
debted to Professor Robert Ferguson of Columbia University for introducing 
me to Benito Cereno, and several of the ideas in this paper (noted more specifi -
cally within), which were presented in lectures on October 16 and 18, 2000. 
Gratitude is also due to Stephanie Elsky and Gwyneth Horton, both formerly 
of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP, for their editing efforts and valu-
able feedback. Finally, this paper would never have been written is not for the 
constant encouragement, keen editing, and invaluable advice of Sailaja Sastry.
 2 The “Gordian knot” was, according to Phrygian tradition, an impossibly com-
plex know tied by Gordias, who was made king of the city of Telmissus when he 
fulfi lled a prophecy by wandering into town with an ox-cart. In gratitude to the 
god Sabazios, he tied the ox-cart to a post, creating with the rope the Gordian 
knot, which became a metaphor for a seemingly intractable problem. It was then 
prophesized that the one who could undo the knot would become ruler of the 
Asian empire. Alexander the Great fi nally “solved” the problem by slicing the 
knot in half with his sword (Lane 149–51).
 3 For those unfamiliar with the process of how a multilateral treaty comes into 
force, I present a brief and simplistic overview. First, a certain number of coun-
tries that have negotiated its terms must vote to approve its text as a general 
matter. Second, if the text is approved by a suffi cient number of countries, a 
designated number of countries have to become signatories to the treaty (that 
is, their executive or administrative offi cers must agree to its terms). Third, as 
most treaties also require countries to ratify them (such treaties are called “non-
self- executing”), each signatory country must also approve the treaty in its des-
ignated legislative body. For example, for the United States to become party to 
a treaty, fi rst the U.S. State Department negotiates the terms of the treaty and 
then, if satisfi ed with those terms, votes for it; then the President or a designated 
offi cial signs it; and then the Senate ratifi es it by majority vote. For more on the 
rather complex process of how a treaty is concluded and entered into force, see 
Sinclair 29–36.
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 4 Despite American’s explicit rejection of ratifi cation, one may argue that the ICC 
has jurisdiction over Americans anyway. On its face, the treaty gives authority to 
try non-signatories in the ICC. This makes sense, since it was unlikely that, for 
example, a Slobodan Milosevic would sign such an instrument. And the treaty 
was also designated to take into account stateless actors, such as, for example, 
Osama bin Laden.
   Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, to which the United States is a 
signatory, a non-ratifying signatory to a treaty, while not held to the document’s 
specifi c terms, is nonetheless prohibited from any act, which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty. See, for example, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Exec. L, 92nd. Cong. 1st Session. (1971), art. XVII: “A State is 
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty 
when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the 
treaty subject to ratifi cation, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its 
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its 
consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty 
and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.” See also Case 
of the German Settlers in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 7, at 30. 
Formally rejecting the treaty for the formation of the ICC, as the Bush admin-
istration did, is almost certainly and act defeating the object and purpose of the 
treaty. Note, however, that a treaty can lose its binding effect if a suffi cient num-
ber of parties engage in conduct that is at odds with the constraints of the treaty.
 5 See, for example, May 6, 2000 letter from then-Undersecretary of State John 
Bolton, who is now the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
 6 This was not the fi rst time that the United States withdrew from an interna-
tional crime court. The United States had been a participant in the International 
Court of Justice since August 1946, but President Reagan revoked the United 
States’ acceptance of the ICJ’s jurisdiction and withdrew fully in October 1985 
after Nicaragua won a judgment against the United States in the ICJ for min-
ing its harbors and aiding the “contra” rebels in the Nicaragua v. United States 
case. The merits of the decision of that case is available at <http://www.gwu.
edu/~jaysmith/nicus3.html> (last accessed September 2005).
 7 For example, a proposed tribunal to examine war crimes in Burundi follow-
ing the 1994 massacres in the Security Council because of disagreements over 
penalties from local states: Rwanda, for example, at the time a nonpermanent 
member of the Council, would not support a tribunal unless it carried that abil-
ity to impose a death penalty, whereas France would veto any proposed Tribunal 
that had such a capability. Eventually, the proposed Burundi Tribunal became 
an “international commission of inquiry,” without any power to punish. See, for 
example, U.N. Sec. Council Res. S/RES/102 (1995) 28 August 1995.
 8 The overall 5% target for developing countries is to be met through cuts of 
8% in the European Union (EU), 7% in the US, and 6% in Canada, Hungary, 
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Japan and Poland. New Zealand, Russia, and Ukraine are to stabilize their emis-
sions, while Norway may increase emissions by up to 1%, Australia by up to 
8% and Iceland by up to 10%. See United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change <http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccpo/faqs_kyoto.htm> (last accessed 
September 2005).
 9 For more detailed information see Climate Change Projections Offi ce of the 
Department of Trade and Industry of the United Kingdom, “Frequently Asked 
Questions: Kyoto Protocol.” Available at <http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccpo/faqs.htm> 
(last accessed September 2005).
 10 See <http://unfcc.int/essential_background/Kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratifi cation/
items/2613.php>, as of July 28, 2005. Russia had committed to ratifi cation at the 
2002 Johannesburg summit, but did not ratify the treaty until late 2004, after Russia’s 
cabinet endorsed the treaty and sent it to the Duma. See Mydans, Seth and Andrew 
C. Revkin, “With Russia’s Nod, Treaty on Emissions Clears Last Hurdle,” The New 
York Times, October 4, 2004. The treaty then entered into effect 90 days later, without 
any US participation.
 11 For more details on this see Ackerman, David. Global Climate Change: Selected 
Legal Questions About Kyoto Protocol, January 10, 2001. <http://www.ncseonline.
org/NLE/CRSreposrts/Climare/clim-15.cfm?&CFID=6822400&CFTOKEN
=18386234>.
 12 For the context of this quotation see Horner, Christopher. “Modern Developments 
in the Treaty Process: Recent Developments Regarding Advice and Consent, 
Withdrawal, and the Growing Roles of Nongovernmental Organizations in 
the International Agreements With Particular Examination of the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol.” Paper of The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies.
 13 See, for example, Cline, William R. “Meeting the Challenge of Global Warming.” 
Ed. Bjorn Lomborg. Global Crisis, Global Solutions. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2004. Note that prices given are 1990 prices (the goals set by the Kyoto Protocol 
were to freeze the fi rst world’s carbon emissions at 5% below their 1990 levels).
 14 Of course, this essay is not the fi rst to pose the question of why nations obey 
international law to the extent that they do; there is widespread disagreement 
on that question on both positive and normative levels. For a survey of sources 
examining this questions see Koh, Harold Hongju. “Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?” Yale Law Journal 106 (1997): 2599, 2603. One of Koh’s 
many contributions in this area is the observation that “fair” international rules 
must penetrate into a domestic legal system, “thus becoming part of that nation’s 
international value set,” such that “repeated compliance gradually becomes ha-
bitual obedience” (2599).
 15 I am indebted to Robert Ferguson for the idea, presented in a lecture on October 
18, 2000 at the Columbia University School of Law in New York City, that this 
compact between Babo and Cereno could be considered some form of con-
tract.
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 16 Killing Cereno is not actually Babo’s only enforcement option. He could tor-
ture Cereno, or threaten torture, until Cereno submitted. Indeed, Babo could 
even justify such torture as self-defense—were they not to reach Senegal, he and 
the rest of the slaves are likely to be caught and executed. The legal justifi ca-
tion for torture as necessary means of self-defense has been advocated recently 
by the United States Department of Justice’s Legal Offi ce of Legal Counsel, in 
an August 1, 2002 memorandum written by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. 
Bybee. After its June 8, 2004 release by the Washington Post (see <http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html>), the Bush ad-
ministration distanced itself from the memorandum. Subsequent to authoring 
the memorandum, Bybee was nominated by President Bush, then confi rmed 
by the Senate, as a federal judge on the Ninth United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals.
 17 American contract law, at least, allows for an “economically effi cient” breach 
of contract by a rule of damages that generally awards damages to an aggrieved 
party in the amount that the party expected to receive from the contract. For 
example, Adam agrees to sell Bill and apple for $1. Before they can exchange 
the apple and money, Carols offers Adam $2 for the apple. Adam can break his 
contract with Bill, and take Carole’s offer for more money. Since Adam has no 
more apples, Bill is required to buy and apple in the open market, and it is more 
expensive—$1.50. Bill can sue Adam for the extra fi fty cents he had to spend 
due to Adam’s breach of contract. Adam will have to pay Bill that fi fty cents, but 
will still walk away from the deal with and extra fi fty cents more than he would 
have had if he did not breach the contract. Even in losing the lawsuit Adam 
has been rewarded for his economically effi cient breach of contract. However, 
Adam’s solution does not address the problem of whether the breach was morally 
justifi ed, given that he has forced upon Bill certain other transaction costs, in-
cluding time, aggravation, and the cost of suing to recover the fi fty cents. These 
costs were, so to speak, more than Bill had bargained for. Although this scenarios 
raises several issues of justice of a cost-effi cient breach, it does not imply any 
moral failings on Adam’s part; simply a rational economic decision.
 18 See, for example, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S. 2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
 19 See Restatement (3rd) of the Law of the Sea, § 502. As one British case from 
around the time of Melville’s writing put it, “it is clear that an English ship on 
the high seas, out of foreign territory, is subject to the law of England” (Regina v. 
Leslie 8 Cox Crim. Cas. 269 Ct. Crim. App. 1860). In another case from the era, 
an American crewman on board a British vessel in a river in France murdered 
a crewmate, and a British Court upheld his conviction under British law; see 
Regina v. James Anderson, 11 Cox Crim. Case 198Ct. Crim. App. 1868.
 20 See, for example, Gilmore, Grant. The Ages of American Law. New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1979, 48, where he states, “Law refl ects but in no sense determines the 
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moral worth of a society. The values of a reasonably just society will refl ect them-
selves in a reasonably just law. The better the society, the less law there will be. 
In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb. The 
values of an unjust society will refl ect themselves in an unjust law. The worse the 
society, the more law there will be. In Hell, there would be nothing but law, and 
due process would be meticulously observed.”
 21 America’s Model Penal Code of 1962 (in §35.15) does not use the concept of 
“imminence,” but instead talks about “the Present occasion.” The New York 
Penal Code (in §35.15) justifi es self-defense “from what [a person] reasonably 
believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other 
person.” The Model Penal Code is not itself law, but rather an academic model 
that some jurisdictions have adopted as law in whole or in part. For a good 
overview of these issues of self-defense, see Fletcher, George P. Basic Concepts of 
Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988, particularly chapters 2–3. A classic 
example of the imminence requirement can be found in State v. Marshall, 208 
N.C. 127, 179 S.E. 427 (N.C. 1935), in which the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina held that because an “aggressor” picked up a hammer during a bar 
fi ght, but did not have the hammer “in a striking position” the trial court was 
correct in disallowing the defendant’s assertion of self-defense for shooting the 
hammer-bearer.
 22 As a less severe, but similar example, a New York court held that is was not self-
defense to throw a rock at an “aggressor’s” head when the “aggression” consisted 
of a thorough splashing with a bucket of water (In re Taylor, 62 Misc.2d 529, 309 
N.Y.S.2d 368 (1970).
 23 Jurisdictions vary in terms of what assaults can justify mortal self-defense. Most 
American jurisdictions allow a defender to use mortal self-defense not only to 
defend against deadly assault, but also against such heinous crimes as rape, and 
some allow mortal self-defense against other serious crimes. See, for example, 
Model Penal Code, §3.04(b)(2) that allows the use of deadly force in self-defense 
against imminent threat of death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping, or sexual 
intercourse compelled by force or threat. For the contrary view, see State v. Clay, 
297 N.C. 555, 256 S.E. 2d 176, 182 (1979) which limits the use of deadly force 
in self-defense to instances of imminent death or great bodily harm.
 24 Model Penal Code, § 3.04. Most American states have adopted the objective 
theory of self-defense described herein. But some, such as California, have ad-
opted a more subjective theory, and New York takes the middle ground of re-
quiring the “reasonable” belief that an attack is imminent—giving the defender’s 
belief some credence, but requiring the defender to have some objective basis 
for his/her belief.
 25 This distinction can be broken down further: most subjective jurisdictions re-
quire the defender to point to objective factors that caused his belief (for ex-
ample, that his subjective belief was reasonable), but the degree of latitude that 
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the defender has in asserting the reasonability of his own belief can vary. For 
example, in State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 211, A.2d 359 (N.J. 1965), the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held that, under New jersey law, a party may intervene in 
defense of a third person if he subjectively believes that the third person is in 
danger; but, to avoid being convicted for harming the person the intervener 
thought was the aggressor, the jury must “objectively fi nd that the intervener 
reasonably arrived at the conclusion that the apparent victim was in peril, and 
that the force he used was necessary.”
 26 To reverse the roles: what if Bangladesh decides its existence is imminently 
threatened by global warming, which it determines is caused by pollution, the 
plurality of which is generated by the United States? Would Bangladesh be “jus-
tifi ed” in launching an attack on smog-producing factories in the United States? 
Under the subjective standard, Bangladesh could even prove its theory on an ob-
jective standard, if it could reasonably prove to an objective third party—again, 
if one could be found—that in fact its existence was “imminently” threatened. 
Of course, it is unlikely that Bangladesh would be provided with “due process” 
to state any such claims after having attacked the United States.
 27 The court of public opinion may have some infl uence, as the United States 
would want to demonstrate for political reasons that it was justifi ed. However, 
a position of suffi cient strength can adequately substitute for, or render moot, a 
failure to justify one’s actions.
 28 Melville handles this counterfactual supposition in part by setting his story in 
1799, before the 1820 treaty between Britain and Spain, and thus, presumably 
alters what would have been the Court’s reasoning had the San Dominick been 
found off the Long Island coast.
 29 See, for example, Apetheker. See also Foner.
 30 Again, I thank Robert Ferguson for raising the connection between “the knot of 
contrariety” from Whitman’s poem “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry,” and the under-
standing of slavery in 18th and 19th century America.
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